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Four Views on Divine Providence. Edited By Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W.
Jowers. Zondervan: Grand Rapids, MI, 2011, 264 pp., $19.99.
Questions concerning how God providentially orders the course of history can
be some of the most controversial and dense, yet comforting and spiritually intimate
inquires one could make. In this Counterpoints series, Four Views on Divine
Providence, four scholars present their case for a coherent and biblical depiction of
God’s providential care and self-glorification. The formats of these discussions are
conducive for honest and open dialogue unimpeded by arguments guised as
strawmen. There is a spectrum of thought being represented. On one end, Paul
Kjoss Helseth presents the view that God causes all things, Ron Highfield with the
concept of divine control by liberation, William Lane Craig’s Molinist understanding
that God directs all things, and ending at the opposite end of the spectrum with
Gregory A. Boyd’s open theism, God’s self-limitation of control.
Paul Helseth commences the four-way dialogue with the model of divine
omnicausality. Helseth’s research is quite impressive for such a short essay and
should be commended for being detailed and well-versed. The omnicausal model of
divine providence suggests that God accomplishes all his good purposes not just by
preserving and passively observing what he has created but also by simultaneously
working concurrently with created things to cause them to act as they do in his alldetermining will (30-31). There are several problems in claiming that God causes
everything, some of which will be reserved for later criticism throughout this review
(i.e. responsibility and the role of evil, which Craig and Boyd offer excellent counterarguments), but the most fundamental problem is how Helseth views the ontic
status of reality.
Helseth introduces a radical doctrine of creatio continuans (32-37). Though it
is true that all reality, which is ontologically external from God, is not self-existent,
it does not follow that its contingency requires continual creation as a form of
preserving its existence. As Craig argues, God may sustain the existence of all
contingent reality and entities by weak actualization not only strong actualization.
Human choices may serve as secondary orders of causation that do not require
God’s direct willing of those contingent state of affairs; rather, it is sufficient that
God may permit such actualizations without directly causing them himself. The
strong actualization of all states of affairs has deleterious implications for how
responsibility, evil, and even the holiness of God are viewed. Thus, the ontic status
of the actual world must not be dependent on God to produce all the effects that are
manifested as long as there is a second order of causation, namely, free agents as
argued by Craig and Boyd.
William Lane Craig presents his Molinist case for providence by means of
divine direction. He begins with a historical background and development of middle
knowledge, which is the crux of Molinism. In this interlude the Molinist semantics
are defined with illustrative examples to aid in understanding them. The stage is
set with a well-versed introduction to middle knowledge, which follows three
primary arguments for the Molinist case: biblical, theological, and philosophical
arguments. The curtains are drawn and Craig’s performance begins.
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Middle knowledge is the second logical moment of God’s knowledge. The first
logical moment is God’s natural knowledge. Within the first moment lie all
necessary truths (triangles have three sides, 2 + 3 = 5, etc.). Essentially, it is by
God’s natural knowledge that he knows the range of all possible worlds. The third
moment is God’s free knowledge. This moment is God’s knowledge of the actual
world. What has happened in the past, what is happening, and what will happen in
the future. Appropriately, middle knowledge rests between the first and the last
moments. The second moment contains God’s knowledge of all contingently true
conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood (i.e. If Jones were placed in
circumstance S God knows Jones would do X). It would have been beneficial for
Craig to spend less time on the historical development of Molinism and more time
presenting a more robust concept of middle knowledge and its associated semantics.
Though he does emphasize the semantic distinctions throughout his presentation,
many of the criticisms against Craig originate from their lack of a fundamental
comprehension of middle knowledge.
Helseth responds to Craig on two primary grounds: expelling evidence and
argument for libertarian freedom and dismissing divine middle knowledge with the
latter being an implication of the former. Helseth’s first criticism is against Craig’s
presupposition of libertarian freedom, which he brings to the text during his
exegesis. I maintain that Helseth may have a case to be made for why an exegetical
rendition of Scripture should direct one to rejecting human libertarian freedom but
he makes no such argument for why the experience of freedom should be considered
illusory or why the appearance of it in Scripture is a ruse (arguments initially made
by Craig). A concession is made that although no Reformed thinker embraces the
idea that humans are automatons though there is a sense of responsibility (107).
However, this denial is left unjustified with no further argument for why
responsibility remains with the human agent.
By implication of Helseth’s rejection of libertarian freedom so goes the
subjunctive contingencies of such creatures. This should be expected, it is simply
what follows from denying such an understanding of human agency. With this,
Helseth capitalizes on two more arguments. The first argument attacks the
coherency of middle knowledge on grounds that it requires a necessity of
contingency. There is not much to be criticized for making such a point since the
counterfactuals of libertarian agents are necessarily prior to the actual world (if it is
the case that humans have libertarian freedom). However, Helseth strengthens
this with his second point, that is, it seems to impinge on the doctrine of divine
perfection by making God dependent (112). Boyd constructs a similar argument
from the grounding objection claiming that contingent truths are not selfexplanatory but must simply exist, from all eternity, as an ungrounded,
metaphysical surd (131). This objection is merely the result of misunderstanding
the means by which God knows what he does. God’s knowledge is wholly intuitive
and relies on no existent entity and is completely compatible with divine aseity.
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According to Luis de Molina,
God does not get his knowledge from things, but knows all things in himself
and from himself; therefore, the existence of things, whether in time or
eternity, contributes nothing to God’s knowing with certainty what is going to
be or not to be… For prior to any existence on the part of the objects, God has
within himself the means whereby he knows all things fully and perfectly;
and this is why the existence of created things contributes no perfection to
the cognition he has of them and does not cause any change in that
cognition… [And] God does not need the existence of those things in his
eternity in order to know them with certainty.1
Additionally, I extend the same criticism of Helseth and Boyd to Highfield when he
constructs a misguided argument against the “conceptualist” scheme of Molinism.
The problem with his argument is that he presents Molinism more in sync with
Platonic thought rather than conceptualist thought suggesting that God requires an
eternally existing world of ideas that exist independently of him in order for God to
know them (117).
Both Helseth and Highfield close their criticisms of Craig with an appeal to
sovereignty. Helseth accuses Craig of being too philosophical and not sticking to a
correct theological method while one finds Highfield making similar claims that
Craig’s theory is “elegantly flawed” and the philosophical criticisms should be left to
the “God of the philosophers” (106, 114). Highfield continues by suggesting that
limiting the scope of sovereignty to what is feasible does not do justice to divine
sovereignty. This is to illicitly convert the modal notion of omnipotence with the
categorical notion of omniscience (117-121). The reader is then proposed to face the
so-called Molinist dilemma of choosing the highest praise for God by saying, “God is
sovereign over all things, except the laws of thought and counterfactual truths,” or
“God is sovereign over all things, no exceptions (121).” To make the claim that
Molinism is too philosophical and does little justice to the sovereignty of God is
doubly guilty of categorically hijacking the discussion. Helseth would have done
well to focus more on the metaphysics of human agency to support his determinism
than to deny it without offering a reciprocal argument. Though Highfield offers the
strongest arguments against middle knowledge on the grounds of impeding upon
divine aseity, his arguments may similarly be used against his own position in
claiming that an external reality is required for God to know such states of affairs
with certainty. Middle knowledge is possessed and known by God logically prior to
creation just as he knows his natural knowledge. If an external reality is required
for middle knowledge to be substantiated it is difficult to justify why the range of all
possible worlds must not require such a reality since both are categorically prior to
any actual state of affairs.

Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 4.49.12, 11.
1
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I applaud Boyd’s response to Craig because he takes Craig’s arguments to
task and appears to be more familiar with middle knowledge than Helseth and
Highfield. Craig and Boyd both affirm libertarian freedom, which leads the
discourse of criticism to the attempted dismantling of middle knowledge. Boyd’s
critique of Craig is perhaps the densest section of the book but it is also the most
challenging section written against Craig’s position. Boyd clarifies an initial
misconception offered by Craig, which was to purport William Hasker’s definition of
omniscience, a definition Boyd and many other open theists deny.2 Boyd maintains
that propositions about future contingents do have truth-value but only in the form
of might counterfactuals.
Boyd’s charge is that there is a difference between might counterfactuals and
would counterfactuals. Craig’s argument is that might counterfactuals logically
entail would counterfactuals; however, as Boyd notes, contrasting might
counterfactual conjuncts are coherent whereas contrasting would counterfactuals
are not. Consider their example of “Commander Karl might and might not publicly
praise Churchill if given the chance” and “Commander Karl would and would not
publicly praise Churchill if given the chance.”
Boyd would be correct in
demonstrating the inconsistencies if he had made the distinction in a sequential
logical flow between might and would counterfactuals instead of keeping them in
the same logical moment while maintaining their conjuncts. This is not a problem
for a Molinist conception of middle knowledge if the might counterfactual
distinction is kept within Craig’s original sequence, that is, antecedently, the true
might counterfactual implies the true would counterfactual consequent.
Boyd delves deep into the seldom-explicated layers of middle knowledge, that
is, there are two “sub-logical layers” within middle knowledge. The first layer is
divine reaction, God’s progressive apprehension of the truth-value of all
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as they unfold in logical sequence coupled
with his original reactions to these counterfactuals. The second layer is divine
action, God’s transformation of each practicable world into a feasible world by finetuning it according to his full knowledge of everything that could or would happen
in the entire history of that world as a result of different divine response to
creaturely choices.3 Let the might counterfactuals reside in the first layer. God
knows what every libertarian agent might or might not do but, in Boyd’s model, the
knowledge of what libertarian agents would do does not carry over to the second
layer, only the action of what God would do given the might counterfactuals. This is
quite ironic because God seems to have certain would counterfactual knowledge of
his own actions given the knowledge of might counterfactuals of libertarian agents.
Boyd’s attempt to present his neo-Molinist position inevitably falls short in offering
a robust concept of providence.

God is omniscient = God knows all propositions, which are such that God’s knowing them is
logically possible.
3 Kirk R. MacGregor, A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 2007), 94-99.
2
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I appreciate Highfield’s tone throughout his chapter on providence by offering
sincere attempts to do justice to Scripture and to exalt God as sovereign over
everything. However, the end of the chapter leaves Highfield in a quagmire of
conflicting premises with an appeal to mystery. He begins with several pages
discussing the question of “how” God accomplishes his works and that we should not
be afraid of laying this question at the transcendent mystery of God.
There is a difference between a logical paradox and an epistemic paradox. In
a logical paradox, somewhere along the line of reasoning two or more premises
negate each other, which render a contradictory conclusion. An epistemic paradox
has all true or consistent premises but the conclusion is either not what was
initially expected or the premises have been exhausted and no more information
may be available to fill epistemic gaps between the premises and the conclusion
giving the appearance of a contradiction, though no contradiction actually obtains.
The “how” questions like, “How did God create the world?” and “How did Jesus
become incarnate” are epistemic paradoxes, no contradictions obtain in answering
these questions. We are simply left with epistemic gaps at certain points. This is
where mystery and transcendence belong. Highfield’s model of control by liberation
does not belong in the same camp as transcendent mystery; rather, it is logically
inconsistent arriving not only at contradictions but also problematic internal
discrepancies.
The term control is incredibly ambiguous and I am sure each contributor to
the book would affirm the categorical notion that God controls everything, it is a
question of what he can control (i.e. states of affairs, agents, etc.) and to what
extent. When setting Highfield’s notion of control into his context, problems arise
from the very beginning. Highfield maintains that human freedom comes into
being through a sovereign divine act and that they do not conflict since human
freedom depends absolutely on divine power (148). However, for God not to be able
to cause human freedom to accomplish his divine will freely seems to imply a risk of
fallible persuasion, and since God’s will is infallibly accomplished, he must be able
to cause human freedom in such a way that they freely accomplish his appointed
end (150).
Highfield’s contradictions arise in how he attributes divine causation to
human freedom. He does note that some believe causing a free agent to freely do
something is a contradiction but he seems to deny such reasoning. It depends on
how God causes the agent’s freedom. If by cause he means that God caused the
existence of human freedom in the form of a derived or given freedom then no
contradiction obtains. However, Highfield’s notion of divine causation of free
agency is a logical contradiction and not an epistemic mystery of divine
transcendence, as he would like to argue.4 This type of divine causation on human
agency makes freedom illusory or superfluous with respects to responsibility at
best.
Highfield does not specify his precise position but it seems that he may embrace
compatibilism, which of course runs into more voluntaristic problems and only pushes the issue of
determinism back one step, an issue Craig discusses.
4
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There are several unanswered questions that lie in the milieu of Highfield’s
arguments. The first is a question that Boyd raises, “What is it that humans are
being liberated from (178)?” This universal divine determinism allows God to make
the choices of all the initial conditions to all states of affairs. Why is it the case that
there must be any liberation at all? Craig argues that according to this type of
determinism, “God makes people sin and then punishes them for it, and the world
becomes a farcical charade (171).” If Highfield wants to maintain that it is human
sinfulness then what becomes of freedom and responsibility with all causation being
attributed to God? Under Highfield’s model, God’s will is formulated in a
disjunction. Either God wills oppression or God wills liberation. An understanding
of divine will, which is much more coherent, and as Craig and Boyd might argue,
should be in the form of an antecedent and a consequent. Antecedently, God wills
beatitude, salvation, etc. but because of human freedom, some reject God and
consequently God wills for them to receive their own damnation. There are no
compromises to a modal understanding of divine omnipotence and this
understanding places the “how” of God’s sovereignty in his categorical omniscience.
Highfield’s understanding of God’s sovereign control runs in sync with Ockhamism,
which is to say that God can do anything arbitrarily had he chosen to do it (i.e. God
could have chosen to make 2 + 2 = 5 instead of 4). The implications that carry from
such an understanding of omnipotence has more deleterious implications on
modality than what simply rests within Highfield’s argument. In the end, and as
Craig concurs, Highfield’s attempt to use human freedom as a means of how God
causally and providentially orders history is no different from Helseth’s.5
Gregory A. Boyd’s contribution to this book is worthy of notable exception for
his elegant communication as well as his ability to present a compelling case for the
openness view of providence. Boyd sets forth his hermeneutic by providing four
criteria needed for a Christocentric understanding of providence: God wages
spiritual warfare, God relies on power and wisdom, God relies on other-oriented
love, and God wins by bringing good out of evil. Amenable to Craig’s reflection on
this hermeneutic, Boyd’s four criteria are necessary but not sufficient for a robust
model of providence. Craig includes two additional criteria, which are consistency
with Scripture and consistency with perfect being theology (224).
Boyd is an ardent proponent of libertarian freedom and suggests that because
God has bestowed humans with such freedom he limits his meticulous control—but
at what cost? He does well to note the modal notion of omnipotence; with
libertarian freedom God’s power is limited to only those states of affairs which are
now feasible. This is where Boyd sacrifices divine perfection when there is no
reason to. As previously discussed with the multilayered notion of middle
knowledge, Boyd presents his might counterfactuals. God only knows what will
happen once character solidification has occurred, a point which seems entirely too
I did not offer much attention to Helseth’s criticism of Highfield since Helseth agrees with
almost everything Highfield states. Helseth’s only objection is in Highfield’s methodology and warns
him that his attentiveness to primary and secondary causations may be too philosophical (166-169).
5
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vague and even problematic for how it is that God knows such propositions but not
others concerning the ontic status of reality.6 I maintain that might counterfactuals
do not give justice to the categorical notion of omniscience and this multilayered
hermeneutic does well in response to Boyd’s appeal to anthropomorphisms.7
Boyd also mounts a case against theological fatalism by arguing that God’s
knowledge (particularly his foreknowledge) does not dictate what happens (196198). Consider the state of affairs S1 → S2 → S3 → S4 in a temporal sequence with
S1 being temporally prior to S2 and so forth. Boyd misplaces the logical priority of
the events in relation to God’s knowledge of the event. Given that the S1 through S4
states of events are chronological in relation to each other, if God knows S4 as being
true at the time of S1 then God foreknows S4 at any temporally preceding moment
(S1, S2, or S3). God’s foreknowledge does not have logical priority over any states of
affairs; rather, these states of affairs have logical priority over God’s foreknowledge.
If God’s apprehension of a state of affairs were logically prior to the state of affairs
then God would not possess knowledge of such states of affairs. Not only does this
damage God’s ontology and knowledge, but, if taken seriously, makes any Scriptural
passage regarding God’s knowledge as superfluous.
Despite Boyd’s short comings on the ontic status of reality and his
inconsistencies with middle knowledge of creaturely freedom and divine action his
arguments deserve more appreciation than what the contributors give him credit
for. His case for an open view of providence does well for bolstering open theism to
a more considerable and attractive view than it has been in recent decades. Boyd
does seem to limit the ontological perfection traditionally equated with the
Anselmian notion of God. His attempt to reconcile the compatibility of libertarian
freedom and divine sovereignty is weakened by reducing the ontology of God with
respects to his cognition—an unwarranted sacrifice in light of the coherence of the
Molinist understanding of middle knowledge and the Scriptural witness of God’s
absolute directive control over every feasible state of affairs.
Both Helseth and Highfield offer very similar views, which offer little
distinction to be made. The editors may have done well to select contributors with
clearer contrasting positions. However, where the book lacks it compensates in its
flow of literary elegance and formidable scholasticism offered by each contributor. I
I have previously discussed the ontic status of reality as it relates to divine omniscience
when defending Craig’s assertion that God’s knowledge is not dependent on anything. Both Helseth
and Highfield criticize Boyd on the point of solidified character arguing for determinism in a coercive
fashion and unilateral causation as the best understanding (211, 233-235).
7 Consider one of Boyd’s examples of God regretting that he had made Saul king (1 Sam.
15:11, 35). When the multilayered middle knowledge hermeneutic is applied the openness sacrifice
of perfect would counterfactual knowledge becomes unnecessary. In the first layer, divine reaction,
God’s original reaction, only having apprehended the truth of the circumstances following Saul’s
actions logically leading up to this, was to literally regret his decision. Upon apprehending the
logically successive knowledge that Saul’s actions would produce states of affairs more desirable for
God considering the second layer of divine action God chose to continue (in a logical, not temporal
sequence) with following the original states of affairs. Thus, when one reads of anthroporphisms
that appeal to divine cognitive states they refer to the first layer of middle knowledge.
6
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anticipate that this book will be received as a prominent work in upcoming
theological and philosophical dialogues concerning divine providence, which may be
appreciated by both laypeople and scholars.
Max L. E. Andrews
University of Edinburgh
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Thomas and the Gospels: The Case for Thomas’s Familiarity with the Synoptics by
Mark Goodacre. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012, 236 pp.,
$39.00.
The Gospel of Thomas has garnered great interest in scholarship since the
Coptic version was discovered at Nag Hammadi in 1945. Its sayings style format
give it an “oral” flare that appears at first glance to preserve an ancient extracanonical stream of Christian tradition. The sayings format fits well with the
modern scholarly trend of viewing antiquity as a predominantly “oral” rather than a
“literary” society. This has led some to herald Thomas as a “fifth” Gospel on a par
with the canonical Gospels or even superior to the canonical writings.
Mark Goodacre is Professor in New Testament at the Department of Religion,
Duke University in North Carolina. His research has focused on the Synoptic
Gospels (where he has argued against the existence of Q), the historical Jesus, and
the Gospel of Thomas. His recent book, Thomas and the Gospels, brings a fresh
perspective to Thomas studies. Rather than picking over the sayings material for
earlier strands of Christianity as is commonly done, Goodacre examines and
evaluates Thomas on its own terms as a literary work.
Chapter one orients the reader to modern trends in Thomas studies and
introduces the thesis of the book which argues that the author of Thomas was
indeed familiar with the Synoptics (p. 7). The discussion centers on reasons scholars
give for an early, independent Thomas (p. 8). The most “influential” being “tradition
history,” which views Thomas as sourced in “a parallel and separate tradition”
independent of the canonical Gospels (p.18). This is based on the view that if the
author used the Synoptics as source material then Thomas “would have inherited
all of the accumulated tradition-historical baggage owned by the Synoptic text, and
then added to it his or her own redactional twist” (p. 18). And because the sayings
do not reveal this level of “historical baggage” from the comparable Synoptic
material, then Thomas must not have derived its sayings from any of the Gospels.
Goodacre spends the rest of the work answering this argument and gathers an
impressive level of evidence against this view.
The first pieces of testimony assembled by Goodacre are the verbatim
agreements between the Thomasine sayings and their Synoptic counterparts.
Working from the understanding that Thomas was originally authored in Greek,
the three Oxyrhynchus fragments that preserve an early Greek form are used to
compare the sayings with the Synoptic pericopes. Several places of verbatim
agreement are discussed but the longest is at saying 26 which exhibits a
remarkable thirteen word agreement with Mat 7:5 and Luke 6:42. It is common
practice in Synoptic studies to use verbatim agreements between pericopes as
criteria to recognize inter-Synoptic links (p. 32). In the same way, these verbatim
agreements in Thomas reveal “a direct link between Thomas and the Synoptics” (p.
48). The direction of this link is discovered by searching “for distinctive, redactional
features of one text appearing in another” (p. 49). Goodacre refers to these
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“redactional features” as “diagnostic shards” (p. 49) There are several sayings in
Thomas that do in fact exhibit both Matthean and Lukan special material.
Saying 57 contains many elements of Matthew’s “wheat and tares” parable
(Mat 13:24-30) which is an expansion of Mark’s parable of the sower (p. 77-78).
Thomas also uses characteristic Matthean imagery and phrases such as “kingdom
of the heavens” (p. 81). There are even more examples of Lukan redaction in
Thomas than there are for Matthew. Saying 5 and 31 are particularly striking as
the Greek fragments reveal a verbatim agreement with Luke over their parallel in
Mark (p. 82-84). And the parallels between Lukan special material and saying 79
are so remarkable that an entire chapter is given over to discussing them.
Some have argued that the similarities between Thomas and the Synoptics
are the result of textual assimilation by scribes. Goodacre answers this claim by
comparing the Coptic translation to the earlier Greek fragments. The results are
that the Coptic translation actually reveals a tendency to move farther away from
the text of the Synoptics. Indicating that the Matthean and Lukan redactional
material most likely did not derive through textual assimilation by scribes (p. 61).
Another characteristic pointing to familiarity with the Synoptics are the
many “missing middle” segments of the parables and narratives found in Thomas
(p.109). The author of Thomas “redacts the material he takes over from the
Synoptics” and then “fails to narrate the middle part of a given parable or saying”
(p. 109). Several of the sayings that have already been discussed, containing
verbatim agreement with the Synoptics and “diagnostic shards,” are shown to also
lack these “missing middle” elements of the narrative. Saying 57, the “wheat and
the tares,” lacks several key elements of the story in order to make adequate sense
of the pericope. The “tribute to Caesar” narrative in saying 100 reveals that “the
missing middle is a characteristic feature of Thomas’s apparent lack of storytelling
ability and not an effect of Thomas’s closeness to raw, primitive oral traditions of
Jesus’ parables” (p.112). Justin Martyr also exhibits this “missing middle” tendency
when quoting from the Synoptics. Just as in Thomas, these missing narrative
elements point to an author who is familiar with the Synoptic narratives.
Chapter eight does a great job of “unravelling” the complex modern
perspectives on “orality” and literacy in early Christianity (p.128). It is important to
understand these modern trends as much of the argument for an independent
Thomas centers around scholarly perceptions of “orality” and literacy in antiquity.
Several different issues are addressed, especially the impact of “form criticism” on
Thomas studies (p.145). Form criticism considers “simpler forms of sayings and
parables as more likely to be original” (p.146). This and other form critical rules and
methodologies are examined in detail and Goodacre concludes that the approach
“needs to be abandoned” (p. 150).
The discussion over the date of Thomas is more problematic and less straight
forward than the rest of the work because the discussion is entangled in the debate
over the date of the Synoptic Gospels. Goodacre notes that "the case for a post-70
dating for Mark is strong and gaining in momentum in recent scholarship" (p.161).
For some scholars, the most convincing evidence for a post-70 date is found in Mark
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13:14 where Jesus said to his disciples concerning the Temple that "[n]ot one stone
will be left upon another which will not be torn down" (p. 164). Goodacre appears
convinced that Jesus' statements were written by Mark "in full knowledge of the
disastrous events of 70" (p.164). If Mark is post 70, this would place Thomas at the
end of the first century, and with the evidence given of a post-Bar Kochba date,
pushes the composition even further into the middle of the second century.
The key to understanding the purpose and intent behind Thomas is by taking
the opening statements in the incipit seriously. In doing this Goodacre concludes
that the author of Thomas used the Synoptic Jesus as a means of authenticating
new and strange sayings. By interweaving familiar Synoptic sayings with new
sayings and parables, the author of Thomas authenticates the stranger material for
the readers.
Thomas is often "boldly claimed" as a "fifth gospel" (p. 193). After all of the
evidence gathered by Goodacre is assembled and weighed, he concludes that
Thomas is not the "holy grail" for historical Jesus studies (p. 195). However, he does
note that Thomas is "a fascinating artifact offering an early, enigmatic portrait of
an esoteric Jesus" and "deserves the special place it has earned in the scholar's
canon" (p.196).
Thomas and the Gospels is a well written work that balances thorough
research with approachability. English translations of the Coptic and Greek are
given along with the original languages. The various sayings are placed alongside of
each other in helpful tables and columns, giving a visual aid to the various
arguments and textual issues. Throughout the book, Goodacre does a fine job of
engaging with a broad spectrum of scholarly opinions, methodologies, and
presuppositions. This helps introduce the subject to laymen unfamiliar with
Thomas scholarship and aids in framing the work as a whole.
Some evangelicals may take issue with Goodacre's post-70 dating of Mark
and the other Synoptics. Even if one disagrees with a late dating for the Gospels, it
does not detract from the argument for a later dating for Thomas. Others who do
not hold to Markan priority may also find the discussion over "diagnostic shards"
less convincing as they depend on Matthew and Luke redacting Mark. Nevertheless,
the issue of Markan priority does not lessen the fact that words, phrases, and
sayings unique to Matthew and Luke are found in Thomas.
Because many of the issues discussed in this book intersect with church
history, the Synoptic problem, textual criticism, historical Jesus, and the New
Testament canon, Thomas and the Gospels should be on the shelf of every biblical
scholar, church laymen, and pastor, as well as anyone interested in early
Christianity.
Timothy N. Mitchell
Luther Rice University, taztimmitchell@gmail.com

